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Soft governance, restratification and the 2004 general medical services 
contract: the case of UK primary care organisations and general 
practice teams 
 
 
Abstract 
Within the UK National Health Service (NHS), primary care organisation (PCO) 
managers have traditionally relied on the ‘soft’ leadership of general practitioners based 
on professional self-regulation rather than direct managerial control. The 2004 General 
Medical Services contract (nGMS) represented a significant break from this arrangement 
by introducing new performance management mechanisms for PCO managers to measure 
and improve general practice work. This paper examines the impact of nGMS on the 
governance of UK general practice by PCO managers through qualitative analysis of data 
from an empirical study within four UK PCOs and eight general practices drawing on 
Hood’s (1998) four-part governance framework. Two hybrids emerged: (1) PCO 
managers emphasised a hybrid of ‘oversight’, ‘competition’ (‘comptrol’) and peer-based 
‘mutuality’ through their granting of increased support, guidance and autonomy to 
compliant practices; (2) Practices emphasised a broad acceptance of increased PCO 
‘oversight’ of clinical work that incorporated a ‘restratified’ elite of general practice 
clinical peers at both PCO and practice levels. Given the increased international focus on 
the quality, safety and efficiency within primary care, a key issue for PCOs and practices 
will be to achieve an effective, contextually-appropriate balance between the 
counterposing governance mechanisms of peer-led ‘mutuality’ and externally-led 
‘comptrol’. 
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General practice, primary care, performance management, soft governance, 
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Introduction 
Primary care has a pivotal role in the delivery of accessible, appropriate, and cost 
effective healthcare (Starfield et al. 2005; WHO 2008). Care for common and chronic 
conditions is increasingly being provided by primary care rather than the hospital sector, 
with quality and safety improvement through performance management central 
components of international policy reform (e.g. Commonwealth of Australia 2011; Gauld 
2012; Institute of Medicine 2001). Historically, general practitioners (GPs) within the UK 
National Health Service (NHS) have been largely insulated from the performance 
management culture that has become increasingly important in other areas of UK public 
services (Peckham and Exworthy 2003). Reinforced by their status as independent 
contractors to the NHS rather than employees, and underpinned by soft governance 
mechanisms based on professional self-governance (Sheaff et al. 2003), GPs have 
historically had a highly autonomous role within the NHS, working in partnership with 
other GPs in independent businesses (‘general practices’) that employ practice managers, 
practice nurses, healthcare assistants and administrative staff. The 2004 new General 
Medical Services contract (nGMS) (DoH 2003) represents a significant break from this 
independent status by introducing performance management, audit and inspection by 
local primary care organisations (PCOs) (Primary Care Trusts/Clinical Commissioning 
Groups in England; Health Boards in Scotland), which are administrative bodies 
responsible for commissioning primary, community and secondary care services from 
providers, including general practices,  
 
Recent studies have described the increased performance management of GPs over the 
past decade as representing a shift from individual GP self-regulation based on 
professional expertise to increased external regulation by clinical and non-clinical PCO 
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managers (McDonald et al. 2007, 2009; Waring 2007). A key issue vis-à-vis nGMS is to 
understand the nature and extent of this shift, and the hybrid of governance mechanisms 
being employed by PCOs within the context of this and wider UK healthcare reforms. 
While previous studies examining the characteristics of PCO-practice relations have 
focussed on the views of either PCOs (Coleman et al. 2013; Sheaff et al. 2003) or 
practices (Exworthy et al. 2003; McDonald et al. 2009; McDonald 2012), this study 
examines both PCO and practice perspectives across two UK countries (England and 
Scotland), and the ways in which they differ or converge in the context of wider national 
reforms. After initial data analysis, we chose to draw on Hood’s (1998) four-part analytic 
framework of governance and control in the public sector in order to offer insights into 
the interplay between performance management, soft governance and professional 
restratification in this context, because it resonated with emerging findings.  
 
Governing medical professionals within the UK National Health Service 
A central concept within the sociology of the professions is professional autonomy and 
the degree to which professionals are free to determine the training, content and rewards 
for their work (Dingwall 2008; Freidson 1985). Key characteristics of professional 
autonomy include: expert knowledge and practice (Harrison and Dowswell 2002); self-
evaluation of performance and care (Exworthy et al. 2003); control over the nature and 
volume of medical tasks (Harrison and Ahmad 2000); and an etiquette of equality of 
competence across the profession. Since the early 1980s, there has been a significant shift 
in public sector organization from a bureaucratically centralised public administration 
associated with hierarchy and rational-legal authority, to a ‘new managerialism’ or ‘neo-
bureaucracy’ (Harrison and Smith 2003) associated with privatisation, the creation of 
internal markets, and expanded local managerial discretion (McLaughlin et al. 2002). 
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Contained under the rubric of ‘New Public Management’ (NPM), this management 
philosophy includes a new emphasis on contractual relationships, the dismantling of 
professional bureaucracies, an emphasis on audit and quality improvement schemes, and 
new ways of defining and measuring performance (Bovaird and Loffler 2003).  
 
In order to operationalise these new forms of control, Courpasson (2000) argues that 
managers need to influence professionals in a less directive manner to that of non-
professional employees. Managers will thus attempt to foster amicable relationships with 
professional leaders wherever possible through ‘soft’ governance mechanisms in order to 
minimise opposition within the profession. In return for a lack of managerial interference, 
the profession is, in turn, responsible for the ‘self-regulation’ of the quality of its 
members’ work through its own internal networks, thus assisting in the implementation 
of policies alongside general managers (Flynn 2004). ‘Hard’ managerial control of 
professionals is therefore possible (for example, through audit (Power 1997)), provided it 
is combined with the ‘soft’ acceptance of a limited professional autonomy. Courpasson 
(2000) writes that this is achieved firstly through ‘flexible corporatism’, in which 
professional elites possess a boundary role between managers and ‘rank-and-file’ 
members of their profession, and secondly through three ‘structures of legitimacy’ of 
managerial leadership to minimise professional revolt. Sheaff et al. (2003) summarise 
these as: (1) ‘instrumental legitimation’ (promoting the organisation’s aims in terms of 
performance indicators); (2) ‘political legitimation’ (justifying the transfer of authority to 
managers through assurances that the relationship will be non-exploitive); and (3) ‘liberal 
legitimation’ (representation by managers of various external threats to the organisation’s 
survival, with managerial decisions ensuring that these threats are minimised).  
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nGMS represents a further departure from this professionally-led mode of governance 
through the introduction of new performance management mechanisms of audit and 
sanction into general practice by clinical and non-clinical managers. The following 
section describes the detail of these changes across two UK countries (England and 
Scotland) within the context of wider national healthcare policy changes since 2004. 
 
Governing UK general practice 
Prior to 1990, the majority of general practice income was derived from capitation, 
allowances, and a limited range of fees for providing particular services. The care 
provided in return for these payments was left largely to professional discretion, which 
limited the ability of local healthcare managers to influence the distribution, quality and 
range of services provided by GPs in their area (Huntington 1993). Historically, PCOs 
have lacked strong command or contractual authority over GPs. The 1990 General 
Medical Services contract introduced some performance management by providing GPs 
with financial incentives to achieve a small number of clinical targets and improve health 
promotion activities. During the late 1990s, PCOs were then given formal clinical 
governance responsibility for general practices in their area. In 2004, nGMS extended 
these trends by introducing performance indicators, financial incentives, and increased 
measurement and regulation of clinical work (Roland 2004). A key element of nGMS 
was the Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF), in which practice-level quality of care 
is measured against a range of evidence-based indicators relating to clinical, 
organisational and patient experience aspects of care, with payments made according to 
practice achievement measured against ~150 quality indicators. As a UK-wide contract, 
nGMS was developed during a period of significant growth in healthcare resources, 
averaging nearly seven per cent per year until 2010/11 (Appleby et al. 2009), with 
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significant investment in general practice planned via nGMS (National Audit Office 
2008). However, following the UK financial downturn in 2008, PCOs had been under 
increased pressure to reduce spending in primary care wherever possible due to reduced 
healthcare budgets. In NHS Scotland, while the overall health budget had increased since 
2004, these increases were offset by demands on local PCOs post-2008 to make 
“efficiency savings”, whilst in NHS England there was a reduction in overall funding of 
approximately £15-20 billion over the three years from 2011-14 (Nicolson 2009). 
 
nGMS has also undergone several changes since it was first introduced in 2004, including 
a major revision in April 2006 that included an increase in the number of clinical 
domains from 11 to 18, and a reallocation of points. Further minor changes had taken 
place during subsequent years, with further additions and reallocations of points across 
both the clinical and organisational domains. Over the past decade, nGMS has also been 
implemented in increasingly divergent ways across the four devolved UK countries 
which reflect wider political and ideological differences therein (Greer 2008). In NHS 
England, the delivery of primary care was designated to Primary Care Groups (later 
reformed as Trusts), with responsibility for commissioning primary and community-
based services for defined populations. In 2004, practice-based commissioning (PBC) 
was introduced (DoH 2006), which devolved the commissioning of primary care services 
from PCTs to general practitioners and groups of practices (known as “consortia”) to 
provide more efficient, responsive services closer to patients’ homes (Checkland et al. 
2009). Practice-level performance data was provided by PCTs, and practices within these 
groups were expected to make savings via financial incentives in areas such as 
prescribing and hospital referrals (Checkland et al. 2009). PBC forms a key component of 
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NHS England reform policy alongside payment by results, patient choice and enhanced 
competition between providers (DoH 2012).  
 
In line with the wider political impetus in NHS England to introduce markets and 
competition, a further reform was introduced in 2006 that was designed to give PCTs 
new powers to negotiate contracts with commercial companies (Alternative Providers of 
Medical Services contracts or APMS) (DoH 2006) and employ GPs directly. These 
reforms were also intended to shift the role of PCTs from passive payers to active 
commissioners of care (McDonald 2012). Until 2013, PCTs were still legally responsible 
for the contracting process, and practices and local consortia were expected to work with 
their local PCTs to re-design services to improve the patient experience and keep them 
out of secondary care (Checkland et al. 2009). In April 2013, the commissioning budget 
was transferred from PCTs to 211 groups of general practices known as clinical 
commissioning groups (CCGs) who are responsible for approximately two thirds of the 
NHS England budget (Naylor et al. 2013) alongside supporting quality improvement 
work in practices and contract negotiation and performance monitoring. In NHS Scotland, 
the provision of primary and secondary healthcare has remained within integrated NHS 
Health Boards since the start of nGMS, with the provision and delivery of primary care 
services at locality level the responsibility of Community Health Partnerships (CHPs). 
These brought together general practice, community-based care and social care into 
single organisational entities with professional representation across the medical 
professions, and were charged with the delivery of primary and community-based 
services for smaller populations. 
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Sheaff et al. (2003) found in their pre-nGMS study that PCO managers relied on a 
modified version of Courpasson’s (2000) concept of ‘soft governance’ by local 
professional leaders over rank-and-file GPs rather than general managers. Soft 
governance was legitimised through appeals to shared professional values and threats to 
professional autonomy and self-regulation by general management through ‘a gradual 
introduction of managerial techniques and rather subtle individual [moral] incentives’ 
(Sheaff et al. 2003: 425). Freidson (1985) describes the medical profession as 
increasingly “stratified”, with an administrative elite guiding and evaluating the 
performance of professionals against standards developed by a knowledge elite (1985: 
22). The nGMS requirement of practices to submit data on clinical and organisational 
aspects of their care, and the right and duty of PCOs to inspect their local practices for 
verification purposes has given PCOs greater direct managerial authority over practices 
than before, although it is unclear the range of mechanisms involved and how these may 
differ across these two UK national contexts at PCO and practice levels.  
 
Hood (1998) writes that more than one governance mechanism can potentially exist at 
once at different organisational levels. Based on Douglas’s (1978) Grid-Group cultural 
theory, Hood developed a four-part framework distinguishing ‘oversight’, ‘mutuality’, 
‘contrived randomness’ and ‘competition’ as an analytical tool for comparing 
mechanisms of governance and institutional control at different organisational levels 
within the public sector (Figure 1). This framework is based on two axes indicating the 
degree of group boundedness in a particular situation (ranging from individualised to 
collectivised (‘group’)), relative to the degree of social stratification (ranging from 
externally-directed to self-governing (‘grid’)). A number of these modes of governance 
can exist simultaneously as hybrids that vary in emphasis depending on the nature of the 
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relationship being examined. This paper empirically examines the key characteristics of 
PCO governance of English and Scottish general practice via Hood’s (1998) framework, 
focussing on the impact of increased performance management by PCO clinical and non-
clinical managers via ‘restratification’ on the autonomy of general practice professionals. 
 
Figure 1 here 
 
 
Methods 
This paper focuses on the mechanisms and meanings PCO managers and practice team 
members attach to the governance of general practice post-nGMS. The study took place 
in four PCOs located in Scotland and England in 2007-2009. A purposive sampling 
strategy was adopted to ensure heterogeneity in socioeconomic deprivation and 
urban/rural classification across the four PCOs: one PCO in each country was in an urban 
deprived location and the other was in a mixed urban/rural location (Table 1). Full details 
of the case study selection and project methodology can be found at 
http://www.sdo.nihr.ac.uk/projdetails.php?ref=08-1618-126.  The first stage of the study 
comprised semi-structured interviews (n=50) with PCO clinical and non-clinical 
managers with responsibility for the strategic management and operational delivery of 
aspects of nGMS. Interviewees included clinical and non-clinical PCO managers with 
responsibility for the strategic management and operational delivery of the GMS contract 
and local representatives of professional bodies. 
 
Table 1 here 
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After agreeing to participate, interviewees were sent a copy of the interview guide, a 
Participant Information Sheet and a consent form. The researcher conducting the 
interviewee (SG or AR) obtained informed consent before the interview commenced. 
The interview topics included: nature of contact with general practices; views on 
governance of general practice work pre-and post-nGMS; mechanisms of performance 
monitoring and sanctioning; mechanisms of support and guidance; and impact on patient 
care. The interviews lasted 60 minutes on average. 
  
During the second stage, one PCO in each country (PCOs 1 and 3) was then selected for 
further detailed examination. Four embedded case study general practices were recruited 
within each, with a purposive sampling strategy employed to ensure heterogeneity on the 
basis of list size, QOF points achievement in 2005-6, enhanced services participation, and 
practice staff composition (Table 2). Semi-structured interviews (n=40) were conducted 
with a purposive sample of GPs, practice nurses, practice managers and administrative 
staff selected on the basis of their involvement in contract work (Table 3). The interview 
topics included: involvement in GMS-related work; nature of contact with PCO; views on 
PCO performance monitoring and sanctioning; views on PCO support and guidance; 
performance monitoring within the practice; and impact on patient care. 
 
Table 2 here 
 
Table 3 here 
 
All interviews were recorded and transcribed verbatim. Analysis followed a grounded 
analytical approach (Strauss and Corbin 1998). Two researchers (SG and AR) read the 
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interview transcripts to become familiar with the data. Preliminary themes were identified 
through scrutiny of initial transcripts and a coding framework was subsequently 
developed that was grounded in the data collected (Mays and Pope 1995). Both 
researchers consistently applied the framework to the remaining transcripts using NVivo 
8 software. The framework was refined according to emerging themes across the four 
PCOs. The modified framework was then reapplied to all transcripts to ensure that the 
findings were grounded in the data (Glaser and Strauss 1967). This constant comparative 
method continued until no further categories emerged. A selection of the transcripts were 
additionally coded by three other members of the research team (CO, BG and MG), and 
any differences in interpretation of the data were resolved through discussion and 
consensus across the whole team.  
 
Ten key themes emerged from the data analysis which were central to the development of 
the interpretation of the findings from both PCO and practice interviews: national and 
local targets and specifications; PCO performance management; performance monitoring 
and accountability; PCO use of data; support and guidance; professional regulation and 
development; peer-clinician regulation; practice self-monitoring; skillmix; and 
professional boundaries. These themes show dimensions of the interrelationship between 
PCOs, practice team members and the governance of general practice post-nGMS. These 
dimensions are explained in the results and discussion sections through the medium of 
Hood’s (1998) four-part framework across all PCO and practice case studies.                             
 
 
Results 
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In the following four sections, we review the extent to which PCO managers describe 
their employment of each of Hood’s (1998) four types of governance post-nGMS: 
oversight (command and control techniques); contrived randomness (control through 
unpredictable processes); competition (control through rivalry and choice); and mutuality 
(control through collegiality); and practice team members’ responses to these 
mechanisms. 
 
Oversight 
 
PCO perspectives 
nGMS had led to a significant increase in the use of IT systems within practices for the 
recording of clinical and organisational data as part of the QOF. During the QOF year 
(April-March), the Quality Management and Analysis System (QMAS), a UK-wide IT 
system used to determine QOF payments to practices, constantly reported local and 
national disease prevalence to PCOs. At the end of the financial year, QMAS provided 
PCOs with access to the recorded prevalence of disease in practices and performance 
against all QOF indicators.  
 
PCO managers also had new contractual rights of access to practices through three kinds 
of review visit. The first was QOF review visits, which were intended to be trust-based 
and supportive to facilitate practices’ understandings of their own QOF achievement and 
how it could be improved. The second was contract review visits, which were intended to 
address practice performance in terms of activity levels, practice organisational and 
technical changes, enhanced services, and commissioning plans for the following year. 
The third was payment verification visits, where selected practices were subject to a 
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detailed audit to verify the financial claims they had entered into the QMAS system. 
Many interviewees associated these new visits with a need for assurance at PCO-level 
that they were receiving “value for money” and that practices were providing a level of 
care that met the minimum quality criteria:  
 
I would say that with the contract, [practices] can’t just say ‘well, we’ll 
sign up for the contract and provide anything’ and think we are going to 
go away and leave them to it. They have to be monitored and the PCO has 
to be satisfied that we are getting value for money, simple as that. 
(PCO 4, Interview 12, non-clinical) 
 
All four PCOs had developed local standards and league tables as a way of monitoring 
local practice performance. While in Scotland the QOF measures were considered an 
adequate level of achievement, within the two English PCOs standards had been set by 
managers across a broader range of indicators and to a higher specification than the QOF 
“to drive up quality” and “promote best practice, not just the minimum standards” (PCO 
2, Interview 12, non-clinical). A key aim of these tables was to identify “irregularities” 
and “outlying practices” whose QOF scores fell within the top and bottom 10% of local 
achievement levels, and who therefore required further inspection for potential 
underperformance or inflated reporting.  
 
nGMS also provided PCO managers with a new range of regulatory interventions that 
were both ‘compliance-based’ (e.g. financial incentives), and ‘deterrence-based’ (e.g. 
sanctions) (Walshe 2003). Based on Walshe’s (2003) ‘hierarchy of regulatory 
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enforcement’, Figure 2 illustrates the range of regulatory mechanisms employed by PCOs 
on local practices:  
 
Figure 2 here 
 
In particular, PCOs had developed new regulatory systems that could be used against 
‘outlying’ practices that did not deliver care to the specified standards, including the 
withholding of payments or the decommissioning of services: 
 
If we are not satisfied then we will keep on talking to the practice, 
persuading them, harassing them until either they provide the service that 
they said they would - and we were expecting them to - or we will take the 
view that they are not fit to hold a contract and take some serious action 
against them.  
(PCO 3, Interview 25, non-clinical) 
 
In practice, however, there were very few cases of payments being completely withheld, 
or of a service being decommissioned in its entirety by any of the PCOs. Instead, 
managers usually identified the underlying issue as organisational or technical (e.g. that 
staff lacked experience with the new IT systems), and attempted to reach a solution with 
the practice. In Scotland, for example, CHP clinical managers would conduct “pastoral 
visits” to discuss relevant issues with practices. If such supportive approaches did not 
work and other uncontractual underlying issues were believed to be present, then 
decommissioning could then take place, although only around specific services or 
individuals through national disqualification involving referral to the General Medical 
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Council. While the contract provided PCOs with a new range of managerial tools for 
monitoring practices, non-clinical interviewees in particular described considerable limits 
regarding their ability to oversee the nature and quality of the services being provided by 
practices: 
                         
There comes a point where as a manager you need a stick and I don’t have 
any, I don’t think, that aren’t incredibly cumbersome or that require the 
full might of my tribe to use, and I think that’s just maybe too clumsy.  
(PCO 3, Interview 24, non-clinical)  
 
[It’s] a high trust contract, […] because a practice can earn a significant 
percentage of the points available, and at the same time there can be no 
great assurance a quality service has been provided. That’s not to say there 
isn’t one, its saying that it’s not so easy to be assured. 
(PCO 1, Interview 12, non-clinical) 
 
Practice perspectives: 
Across all eight of the practices in the study, the GPs, nurses and practice managers who 
were interviewed described a significant increase in PCO presence since the start of 
nGMS through review visits, practice quality profiles, balanced scorecard approaches and 
benchmarking activities, particularly by non-clinical managers at increasingly local 
levels. For example, in Scotland, local Community Healthcare Partnerships were 
responsible for administering the contract, with both clinical and non-clinical managerial 
involvement. Many practice team members described the increased PCO oversight as 
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necessary and an improvement to the organisation and monitoring of care, particularly for 
patients with chronic diseases: 
 
You’re [now] very used to outside people auditing, looking, measuring, all 
sorts of things within the practice; and it’s commonplace to find somebody 
from the PCO or the medicine management team in here […]. I think [it’s] 
for the better really. It’s much more open, and we’re having to justify 
much more what we’re doing.  
(PCO 1, GP, Interview 66) 
 
[…] you can understand what’s behind reaching these targets. It’s not all 
about the money in the back pockets of the GPs, it’s about patient care and 
looking after your patients, particularly those that are on the disease 
registers.  
(PCO 1, Practice Nurse, Interview 64) 
 
However, PCO oversight was frequently described in terms of a gradual erosion of 
practice-level autonomy as PCOs adopted increasingly complex means of accessing and 
extracting clinical and organisational data from practices: 
 
[…] it feels a bit like Big Brother. It feels like we don’t own our patients 
any more. We don’t own our software any more. I know we don’t own the 
hardware because the PCT buys that, but we don’t own our system any 
more because the PCT can come in, they can change patients’ medication, 
they write to patients and you don’t know what’s going on.  
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(PCO 1, Practice Manager, Interview 42) 
 
All eight practices had also re-organised the leadership and management of their clinical 
work since the start of the contract. For example, QOF achievement was monitored by 
the practice manager or lead GP through regular meetings to discuss progress throughout 
the year. While a lead GP was usually assigned overall responsibility for the clinical 
domains of the QOF, in Practice 1 the lead GP was also responsible for the organisational 
domains of the contract, while in Practices 3 and 5 this responsibility was shared with the 
practice manager and senior practice nurse respectively. Most practices had developed a 
team-based approach to the leadership of clinical domains of the contract, with individual 
GPs having responsibility for specific disease areas (e.g. asthma) alongside individual 
practice nurses, with the latter conducting most of the day-to-day contract work. 
 
Contrived randomness 
 
PCO perspectives 
While both the QOF and wider contract review visits were conducted by the PCOs on a 
rolling basis, the more stringent payment verification visits were conducted by external 
NHS audit organisations on a random basis in order for PCO managers to distance 
themselves from this part of the process and so maintain practice trust. PCO managers 
explained that the random selection procedure ensured that all practices conducted their 
data collection and made their claims honestly, with the threat of this “policing visit” 
(PCO 3, Interview 6, non-clinical) a key driver for ensuring accurate practice data 
recording: 
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[It’s] a high trust contract, so that’s worth emphasising because a practice 
can earn a significant percentage of the points available and at the same 
time there can be no great assurance that a quality service has been 
provided. That’s not to say there isn’t one, its saying that it’s not so easy 
to be assured. We don't have a kind of random ‘I’m going to come and sit 
in your clinic today’ kind of an idea. It wouldn’t help you anyway because 
they would do it that day and they wouldn’t do it the next. 
(PCO 1, Interview 22, clinical) 
 
However, as one PCO manager explained, the trust that many PCOs developed with local 
practices was neither easily nurtured nor uniform: 
 
It’s meant to be a high trust contract and I have high trust in ninety-five 
percent of practices, but I don’t have the tools, I don’t think, to deal 
appropriately with the five percent who I don’t think are satisfactory, and 
they are after all the point of any effort. 
(PCO 3, Interview 24, non-clinical) 
 
Practice perspectives 
Despite the random nature of practice selection, the majority of practice interviewees 
described the payment verification visits as a daunting experience, particularly for 
practice managers and GP leads, who were usually the main practice contacts with the 
PCO:  
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[The payment verification visit] was more scary because […] they were 
double-checking. It was like an audit.  
(PCO3, Practice Manager, Interview 48) 
 
However, many GPs and practice managers explained that as long as they entered their 
data into the IT system honestly there was little for practices to be concerned about:  
 
It’s all computerised, and they suck it out of your system and they can see 
what you’ve done […]. There’s not really much capacity for doing naughty 
stuff unless you were extremely naughty, and most people haven’t got the 
time to be that devious.  
(PCO 3, GP, Interview 52) 
 
However, some interviewees questioned the randomness of these visits and whether 
‘outlying’ practices who sat in the 10% above or below the ‘normal’ range were being 
increasingly targeted by PCOs: 
 
They are now focusing on the practices where they know that there's a 
problem, so practices are now complaining because they have maybe had 
three visits in a row and there's probably a good reason for that.  
(PCO3, Practice Manager, Interview 63) 
 
A further reason for increased visits to particular practices was the presence of clinical 
managers from within the practice team. In Practice 5, one of the GP partners was also 
clinical director of the local Community Healthcare Partnership and the GPs and practice 
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manager suspected that this was the reason why they received such a proportionately high 
number of payment verification visits. They were very clear to stress that it was not 
because the CHP did not trust the practice, but because the other local practices would 
have less trust in the system if there was not additional rigour vis-à-vis practices with a 
PCO managerial presence. 
 
Competition  
 
PCO perspectives 
One of the intended consequences of nGMS was to increase the threat of external 
competition for general practice from alternative providers by building in provider choice 
through the new enhanced services. The introduction of increased locally-developed 
competition via nGMS enhanced services, alongside APMS and PMS contracts in 2006 
was described by English PCT managers as a key motivating factor for practices to 
improve the quality of services that they provided, with stricter criteria being considered 
to help improve the quality of care in existing practices: 
 
I think the prospect of private sector looming on the horizon has unsettled 
people in probably quite a positive way in terms of making them think 
about what they should be doing and taking […] just the threat of it has 
probably had a big impact in terms of people improving care.   
(PCO 2, Interview 4, non-clinical) 
 
This is in line with the findings of Coleman et al. (2013), who explain that the PCT 
managers in their study believed that the presence of Alternative Providers of Primary 
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Care (APPCs) forced practices to “raise their game”. In Scotland, national policy during 
the period of data collection had moved in a less market-based direction, with less focus 
on alternative providers. Despite this difference, PCO managers explained that their main 
priority was to build up good relations with practices and for them to maintain their 
position as “preferred providers” for GMS services: 
 
There aren’t a whole range of providers out there who are saying ‘well, in 
the event that you fall out with your existing provider here we are’. I think 
that Health Boards, with the exception of a poor contractor, will want to 
develop a good relationship with their good contractors.  
(PCO 4, Interview 23, non-clinical) 
 
Alongside QOF scores that were published annually across the whole of the UK, all four 
PCOs had also developed traffic lighting systems for the comparative benchmarking of 
local practices in order to promote professional rivalry and competition. For example, in 
PCOs 1 and 2, practices were benchmarked across a wide range of locally-developed 
quality indicators, and a traffic lighting system was used to highlight standards and 
determine practice performance across a range of quality measures including professional 
leadership within the practice and HR policies and procedures: 
 
Every practice gets to see every other practice’s score as well. Nothing is 
anonymous, which is very powerful, I think, because practices can then 
look over the fence and say ‘well if they can do it that, I’ll do it even 
better’, and I think that generates the motivation to improve. 
(PCO 1, Interview 16, non-clinical) 
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In Scotland, peer regulation was employed in a developmental way through a new 
instrument called the QOF Analyser Tool. This tool was developed in 2006 to be used by 
Board managers during QOF Review Visits and the results of the practice being reviewed 
were explicitly compared against all other practices in the CHP: 
 
You go in there really armed with information, you can look at their 
achievement and if it’s high then you can say so. Often annoyance with 
the QOF Review is about picking up the red bits – are there any 
deficiencies here that we can help to support? Even with high-performing 
practices you will always find in any domain probably three or four areas 
that possibly have potential for improvement. 
(PCO 4, Interview 5, non-clinical) 
 
Practice perspectives 
While practices described the publication of QOF scores through league tables as an 
opportunity to compare their own performance with that of other local practices, it was 
not necessarily a key motivation for them to change their systems and practices beyond 
that:  
 
I think it’s very useful; we enjoy looking at that. We get all these charts; 
it’s like league tables, which produces a lot of steam, a lot of hot air. I 
don’t understand how some practices can score the points they do, do you 
know what I mean? I just don’t know how they do it. So from my 
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perspective, we scored less than our neighbouring practice down the road 
and that really irritated me, really irritated me. 
(PCO 1, GP, Interview 41) 
 
In NHS Scotland, despite there being fewer wider national initiatives promoting 
competition across practices, individuals had a similar response to practices in England:  
 
We all log on now to see how well everybody else has done and, you 
know, you take it as a personal slight if your practice hasn’t done as well 
as Dr Blogs up the road.  
(PCO 3, Practice Manager, Interview 32) 
 
However, despite nGMS driving up ‘like-for-like’ comparisons of performance across 
practices, there was an equally strong claim that practices were still individual small 
businesses with their own unique patient populations that were never truly comparable: 
 
Each practice is different irrespective of whether they’re in the same sort 
of area or the same sort of client list size. Every practice will do something 
differently and that’s what makes comparisons impossible.  
(PCO3, Practice Manager, Interview 47) 
 
Practices were generally not motivated to be the best, but to be “middle of the pack” 
where they would be less visible to PCOs as “it’s the outliers who get all of the attention” 
(PCO 3, GP, Interview 7). nGMS has also highlighted for practices the need for PCOs to 
address performance irregularities across practices, and that there was no excuse for poor 
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performance. Practices also did not express a great deal of concern regarding the presence 
of alternative providers or of their services being decommissioned by PCOs, although it 
is possible that external competition has become an increasing issue for English practices. 
 
Mutuality 
 
PCO perspectives 
PCO clinical and non-clinical managers often referred to the QOF as a voluntary “bonus 
scheme”, and that there should be no justification for penalising practices under these 
circumstances. Across both countries, clinical managers in particular described their 
approach as supportive and developmental in order to promote positive relationships with 
practices: 
 
I think in the majority of cases the PCT has been there in a much more 
supportive role than anything else. Obviously it is important for the PCT 
to have a monitoring role and we are talking about public money…but 
there are practices that have had difficulties and actually the PCT 
thankfully, I think, have bent over backwards to help those practices. 
(PCO 2, Interview 2, clinical) 
 
It’s theoretically a contractual arrangement, but it’s also a colleague 
arrangement. It’s not about checking or policing, it’s more about what 
problems have you found? How are you getting on? What are the issues? 
What do you want to tell us? So you are kind of reviewing the situation 
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and trying to get a sense of just how the practice carries out its quality 
standards. 
(PCO 3, Interview 6, clinical) 
 
In the English PCOs, local managers were also developing systems to enable local 
practices to become more autonomous in their delivery of nGMS. One PCO clinical 
manager explained: 
 
I think it’s positive that GP practices themselves have become more 
autonomous and sort of self-sufficient in a way, rather than its dependency 
on the PCT. So you know you’ve got a contract, go and deliver it…I think 
that, in transactional terms, has sort of changed from a parent-child 
relationship to more of an adult to adult relationship. 
(PCO 1, Interview 16, clinical) 
 
Across both countries, general practice representatives were incorporated into the PCO 
management teams, usually as medical directors, and professional executive committee 
members (for example, the English PCTs has Professional Executive Committees (PECs), 
and the CHPs in Scotland had Professional Executive Groups (PEGs)) to provide clinical 
representation and leadership to rank-and-file GPs in their local areas. These individuals 
were considered to have a broadly sympathetic approach to practices, which would build 
up professional trust. GPs, nurses and practice managers were also involved in the QOF 
review visits, alongside PCO managers and members of the public to offer support and 
guidance to practices. For many clinical PCO managers, this was a key legitimating 
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aspect of the visit as it enabled professionals to give advice on best practice to fellow 
professionals:  
 
Now the approach we have got at the moment is really just tackling bad 
performance. What we have really got to get to is excellent quality 
performance across the patch and we are thinking of using the Royal 
College’s quality practice award as maybe a means to do that but it’s very 
early stages […] it will cover standards for better health and probably a bit 
more, but the beauty of it, in my eyes, is that it’s peer review. It’s your 
own kith and kin that have done this, it’s not government or what have 
you, it’s your own college, your own profession. 
 (PCO 1, Interview 19, clinical)  
 
PCO 1 had also developed new practice visits by ‘high performing’ GPs and practice 
managers who were local professional development leads from a ‘role model’ group of 
local practices against whom all other practices were benchmarked: 
 
If they come up with opposition we’ve kind of had to work through it, 
bring GPs with us, have champions who appreciate the way we’re trying 
to do things and get them to peer influence. 
(PCO 1, Interview 8, non-clinical) 
 
It actually brings another dynamic to the process because obviously 
they’ve seen it from both ends and we’ve picked people who are […] high 
 28 
performers organisationally in their own practice and they’re able to share 
that best practice with others. 
(PCO 1, Interview 17, non-clinical)  
 
At the same time, these peer reviewers were perceived by non-clinical PCO managers as 
being able to be stricter with practices because they had greater professional legitimacy:   
 
They sort them out, they’re much harder than we are…because they’ll just 
say ‘look, if you get inspected at 5% random you’ll be in trouble so 
therefore this is how you do it’, which I can’t do […]. And they’re well-
respected locally so that’s how we’ve got around it. 
(PCO 1, Interview 21, non-clinical) 
 
Practice perspectives 
Practice interviewees described limited face-to-face contact and increased email contact 
with PCO managers since the start of the contract, particularly regarding operation of the 
new IT systems. While many found the payment verification visits highly formal and 
imposing, the QOF review visits were described as both informal and supportive:  
 
They’re not designed to be formal, particularly, and they’re not designed 
to pick fault.  They’re only there to see if you’re falling down in anything, 
and if you were falling down in something they would do their utmost to 
help you and they would point you in the direction of, well, try this or try 
that.  I found they were fine.  It was quite informal.  They were quite 
 29 
happy with everything and the way we run the practice. They said it ran 
very smoothly and they were quite happy with everything. 
 (PCO 3, Practice Manager, Interview 48) 
 
I suppose I expected more of a Spanish Inquisition, but it wasn’t. It was 
just going through the different domains and saying “you’ve reached that 
one, but you haven’t reached that, why is that?”, that sort of thing. 
(PCO1, GP, Interview 47) 
 
Despite differences in the ‘oversight’ mechanisms employed, practices across both 
countries perceived there to be a great deal of freedom in terms of the way in which they 
delivered their care: 
 
We’ve had people come and talk to us about chronic disease management 
and ischemic heart disease and things like that, mostly at our request, but 
there’s not been anyone who’s come out saying “we’re going to tell you 
how to provide this service or that”. 
(PCO 1, GP, Interview 39) 
 
However, some practice team members commented on the fact that PCO contact with 
practices wasn’t consistently supportive across the board, with the more ‘problematic’ 
practices receiving far more help than those considered by the PCO to be “middle of the 
pack”:  
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[…] there has in the past been carrots dangled in front of the non-
performing practices whereas practices who have reached their targets are 
just left to get on with it and I don’t think in certain circumstances it’s 
been fair.  
(PCO 1, Practice Manager, Interview 38) 
 
 
Discussion 
The application of Hood’s (1998) typology of control and regulation to the relationship 
between PCOs and general practices in NHS England and Scotland post-nGMS has 
revealed the presence of complex governance hybrids in both PCO and practice accounts. 
As Waring and Currie explain, the boundary between professionals and managers is 
multifaceted, with the mechanisms of power “often uneven, contested and dynamic” 
(2009: 756). The following sections examine these two hybrids in more detail.  
 
PCO ‘comptrol’ and managerial legitimacy 
nGMS had provided PCOs with a new range of managerial tools for monitoring the 
performance of local practices that combine ‘oversight’, competition’ and contrived 
randomness’. This increase in PCO-level ‘oversight’ can be conceptualised as a new form 
of managerial ‘governmentality’ (Foucault 1991) over medical professionals that 
parallels Hood’s (1986) argument that since the 1980s, public organisations have been 
moving further towards a governance hybrid known as ‘comptrol’ (‘competition’ and 
‘oversight’). However, non-clinical interviewees in particular described considerable 
limits in their ability to oversee the nature and quality of the services being provided by 
practices, which was combined with a lack of punitive measures against outlying or 
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errant practices. While the increased use of ‘competition’ mechanisms was described by 
PCO managers in England in particular as driving up the quality of care across local 
practices, clinical PCO managers in particular relied heavily on ‘mutuality’ as a 
mechanism of peer support and guidance to retain a relationship of trust and goodwill 
with local practices (McDonald 2012; Prosser and Walley 2007).   
 
In their pre-nGMS study, Sheaff et al. (2003) found that it was professional networks that 
employed soft governance mechanisms over rank-and-file clinicians. In this study, both 
clinical and non-clinical managers employed a form of ‘flexible corporatism’ in the 
performance management process through the inclusion GPs, nurses and practice 
managers as peer-reviewers in the QOF review visiting teams and as expert development 
leads in NHS England for outlying practices that required further remedial support and 
guidance. These clinical elites were described as being able exert firmer control over 
practices than non-clinicians due to a PCO perception of mutual respect and equality 
across professionals (Harrison and Ahmad 2000). PCO managers were also beginning to 
employ soft governance techniques through the application of three of Courpasson’s 
(2000) methods of legitimation. First, they relied on the ‘instrumental legitimation’ of the 
clinical and organisational domains of the contract based on the fact that they were 
national, evidence-based, and professionally-developed. Clinicians’ professional 
autonomy therefore remained largely unchallenged by PCO managers as they maintained 
clinical dominance of evidence-based medicine in the face of increased PCO ‘oversight’ 
through the promotion of a biomedical model of medical work (Armstrong 2002). Second, 
PCO managers employed a variant of ‘political legitimation’ as practices were assured 
that compliance with nGMS would result in limited external interference by the PCO, 
thus enabling practices to self-regulate both the recording and conduct of their work 
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through ‘personal ethics’ (Foucault 1991) rather than externally-led control. Clinical PCO 
managers in particular were keen to avoid entering into any form of direct performance 
management with their clinical peers. Third, PCO managers employed techniques of 
‘liberal legitimation’ by stressing that practice failure to comply would result in harder 
‘policing’ visits by external NHS audit organisations, and in England the commissioning 
of alternative providers was perceived as a threat.  
 
Figure 3 illustrates the nature of the PCO governance hybrid using Hood’s (1998) 
typology and incorporating the ‘location’ and ‘expertise’ axes employed by Exworthy et 
al. (2003). The four-part diagram illustrates that for PCOs, nGMS has had a mainly 
‘mutuality’-based framing aimed at technical rather than clinical issues, with professional 
autonomy and self-assessment remaining central. While the role of PCO managers has 
involved increased ‘oversight’ through both ‘competition’ and ‘contrived randomness’, 
peer-based ‘mutuality’ remained the key governance mechanism that they claimed to 
employ in practice.  
 
Figure 3 here 
 
 
Restratification and professional legitimation 
Practices emphasised ‘oversight’ as the main governance mechanism employed by PCO 
managers post-nGMS by an emergent layer of restratified general practice leadership in 
the form of clinical directors, peer-reviewers and practice-level “chasers” (Armstrong 
2002; Exworthy et al. 2003; Freidson 1985; McDonald 2012). The work of these 
individuals was broadly accepted by most practices as they focussed most of their 
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attention on outlying practices (‘political legitimation’). Practices were also broadly 
accepting of the purpose of the contract itself (instrumental legitimation’) provided that 
they were able to retain a degree of autonomy and independence from PCO ‘oversight’ 
(‘liberal legitimation’). Less effective were PCOs’ use of ‘competition’ and ‘contrived 
randomness’ mechanisms. While practices found inter-practice comparisons informative, 
the lack of punitive action against ‘poor’ performers and the perceived lack of ‘real’ 
external competition from alternative providers during the period of data collection 
created limited motivation for practices to improve in these areas. Random payment 
verification visits by external auditors removed PCO managers from the process, 
however practices had started to lack trust in the selection process and question the heavy 
PCO focus on ‘poorer’ performing practices. While PCO managers emphasised their role 
in nGMS as “light touch”, few practices described it in these ‘mutuality’-based terms 
despite PCO intentions to be supportive and facilitative through the inclusion of practices’ 
own “own kith and kin” (i.e. GPs nurses and practices managers) within the PCO 
leadership and as peer-reviewers. However, the majority of practice interviewees 
explained that they were not familiar with their local PCO clinical leads, and instead 
described PCO managers as unilaterally working towards similar performance and 
financially-driven ends through increased proletarianism of practice professionals 
(Britten 2001; Harrison and Dowswell 2002). Figure 4 illustrates the nature practice 
perceptions of the PCO governance hybrid. 
 
Figure 4 here 
 
Practices were also making themselves more internally auditable (Power 1997) through 
internal restratification and the development of practice-level nGMS teams of GPs, 
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nurses and practice managers who acted as “chasers” to monitor and manage the 
performance of the rest of the practice team (Grant et al. 2009). Since the start of nGMS, 
practices had become less ‘impervious to penetration by the nascent clinical governance 
activities’ (Sheaff et al. 2003: 420-1), with ‘rank-and-file’ (Armstrong 2002) members of 
both sub-cultures managerially ‘restratifying’ (Freidson 1985) themselves to make their 
work more externally auditable. Going against more traditional professional values to 
resist judging others (Harrison and Ahmad 2000), GPs and nurses were prepared to 
comment on and criticise poorly performing practices on the basis that elements of their 
care fell below a nationally-accepted threshold.  
 
The practices in this study were purposively sampled to include a range of sizes of teams, 
geographical locations (i.e. urban and rural) and patient populations. However, it was 
difficult to make any direct connections between rurality and deprivation and practice 
relationships with PCOs. We found that the most important factors impacting on practice 
perceptions of and relationships with PCO managers were deeply entrenched professional 
values (Broadbent et al. 1992) and the internal practice culture, including whether the 
practice was internally- or externally-focussed. As Scott et al. (2003) note, these internal 
cultural and sub-cultural elements are not directly linked to practice organisational 
structure, location or patient profile and we found that such generalisations could not be 
made on that basis in either country.  
 
 
Conclusion 
Since the start of nGMS in 2004, general practices have been increasingly encouraged to 
improve the quality, safety and efficiency of the care that they provide, and to be more 
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responsive to the needs of patients while facing increasingly constrained financial 
budgets. This pattern is likely to continue through the further iterations of nGMS that are 
taking place alongside wider national policy developments that aim to increase the role of 
an administrative elite GP stratum further through, for example, CCGs in England and 
partnership-based CHPs in Scotland. These governance arrangements will be dependent 
on the increased application of ‘mutuality’ governance mechanisms by PCO/CCG 
clinical and non-clinical managers, alongside ‘oversight’ and ‘competition’ through, for 
example, nGMS QOF, enhanced services, and the expansion of APMS contracts 
(Coleman et al. 2013).  
 
nGMS is part of a much broader landscape of performance management in the NHS and 
similar patterns of clinician- and managerially-led performance management are 
emerging internationally. For example, recent studies of high-performing healthcare 
systems have highlighted the importance of strong and effective clinical leadership and 
rank-and-file engagement across traditionally disparate and independent professionals 
such as general practice in the UK, Australia and New Zealand, and family and internal 
medicine in the US (Baker et al. 2008). However, the issue of rank-and-file GP 
ownership of elite professional groups is complex, and PCOs will adopt different hybrid 
mechanisms with differing emphases depending on the wider policy setting, healthcare 
system and historical professional-managerial relationships. A key concern that emerged 
from this study has been the achievement of an effective, contextually-appropriate 
balance between the counterposing governance mechanisms of ‘mutuality’ and ‘comptrol’ 
by both PCO managers and practices (Exworthy et al. 2003; McDonald et al. 2009; 
Waring and Currie 2009).  
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Despite increasingly divergent healthcare policies and approaches to nGMS across NHS 
England and Scotland (Greer 2008), we found PCO and practice-level perspectives on 
nGMS governance relationships to be broadly similar across both countries. Further 
examples of the complexity of these ‘mutuality’-‘comptrol’ based arrangements can be 
found internationally in the USA, Australia and New Zealand (McDonald 2012; Gauld 
2012; Smith and Mays 2007). For example, MacDonald (2012) reports that in the USA 
rank-and-file doctors were less accepting of performance targets and peer ‘oversight’ 
than in England, and that elite members of medical groups committees had less zeal for 
implementing new reforms due to their proximity to front-line working. The effective 
soft governance and restratification of general practitioners can therefore only be 
achieved through careful, contextually-appropriate reconciliation of the need to maintain 
rank-and-file practice trust, engagement and professional legitimation (via ‘mutuality’ 
mechanisms), and the development of appropriate methods of measuring, challenging and 
supporting the performance of all practices (via ‘comptrol’ mechanisms).  
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Tables: 
 
Table 1: Characteristics of PCOs 1-4  
 
PCO 1 
Primary Care Trust in England 
Population served: >450,000. 
Deprivation score (income)*: 31.0 
Mean of 3.1 WTE GPs per practice 
Number of PCO interviews: 14 
PCO 2 
Primary Care Trust in England 
Population served: <250,000. 
Deprivation score (income)*: 10.6  
Mean of 4.7 WTE GPs per practice 
Number of PCO interviews: 8 
PCO 3 
NHS Health Board in Scotland 
Population served: >500,000.  
Deprivation score (income)*: 24.2 
Mean of 3.6 WTE GPs per practice 
Number of PCO interviews: 17 
PCO 4 
NHS Health Board in Scotland 
Population served: >500,000.  
Deprivation score (income)*: 12.5 
Mean of 5.1 WTE GPs per practice 
Number of PCO interviews: 11 
*Deprivation score represents the percentage of the PCO who are eligible for benefits on 
the basis of low income. The higher the score, the greater the deprivation. 
 
 
Table 2: Characteristics of practices 1-8 
 
Practice 1 Case Study: PCO 1 
List size: large 
QOF points in 2005-06: Quintile 5* 
Participated in substance misuse enhanced service. 
Staff included: 3-5 GPs; 1-2 practice nurses; practice manager. 
Practice 2 Case Study: PCO 1 
List Size: large 
QOF points in 2005-06: Quintile 1 
Participated in substance misuse enhanced service. 
Staff included: >5 GPs, >2 practice nurses, practice manager. 
Practice 3 Case Study: PCO 1 
List size: large 
QOF points in 2005-06: Quintile 1 
Did not participate in substance misuse enhanced service 
Staff included 3-5 GPs, 1-2 practice nurses, practice manager 
Practice 4 Case Study: PCO 1 
List size: medium 
QOF points in 2005-06: Quintile 4 
Did not participate in substance misuse enhanced service. 
Staff included 3-5 GPs, 1-2 practice nurse. 
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Practice 5 Case Study: PCO 3 
List size: medium 
QOF points in 2005-05: Quintile 1 
Participated in substance misuse enhanced service 
Staff included 3-5 GPs; >2 nurses; practice manager 
Practice 6 Case Study: PCO 3 
List size: medium 
QOF points in 2005-05: Quintile 1 
Did not participate in substance misuse enhanced service. 
Staff included >5 GPs; 1-2 practice nurses; practice manager 
Practice 7 Case Study: PCO 3 
List size: small 
QOF points in 2005-06: Quintile 1 
Participated in drug misuse enhanced service 
Staff included 3-5 GPs; 1-2 practice nurses; practice manager 
Practice 8 Case Study: PCO 3 
List size of small 
QOF points in 2005-05: Quintile 2 
Participated in substance misuse enhanced service. 
Staff included 3-5 GPs; 1-2 practice nurses; practice manager 
*1=highest, 5=lowest 
 
 
Table 3: Practice interviewees by profession 
 
 GP Practice 
Nurse 
Practice 
Manager 
Administrative 
Staff 
Total 
Practice 1 3 1 1 - 5 
Practice 2 2 2 1 - 5 
Practice 3 2 1 1 1 5 
Practice 4 1 1 - 2 4 
Practice 5 2 2 1 - 5 
Practice 6 2 2 1 - 5 
Practice 7 2 2 1 - 5 
Practice 8 2 2 1 1 6 
Total 16 13 7 4 40 
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Figures 
 
Figure 1: Hood’s (1998) four basic types of governance over public services 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: PCO hierarchy of regulatory enforcement post-nGMS based on (Walshe 2003) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
‘Mutuality’ 
‘Egalitarian’ governance 
through formal and informal 
processes of collegiality and 
mutual influence. 
 
‘Oversight’ 
‘Hierarchist’ governance 
through command and 
control techniques. 
‘Contrived Randomness’ 
‘Fatalist’ governance 
through unpredictability. 
 
Collectivised 
‘Competition’ 
‘Individualist’ governance 
through rivalry and 
choice. 
 
Self-governing 
GROUP 
Externally directed 
Individualised 
GRID 
Decommissioning of nGMS services; closure of 
practice 
 
Detailed ongoing supervision or inspection of practices by 
external NHS bodies; withholding of payments 
 
Referral to external NHS bodies for Payment Verification Visit or to 
professional development leads; repeat or follow up inspections; formal 
requirements to remedy problems; 
 
Informal intervention by PCO to deal with minor problems via phone or email; some 
limited follow-up inspection; positive feedback on practice achievements and 
strengths 
Granting of greater autonomy through less frequent visits; financial incentives or rewards for good 
performance; public recognition of achievements through league tables; leading role in communicating 
‘good practice’ to other practices 
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Figure 3: PCO perspective on governance hybrid post-nGMS (based on frameworks by 
Hood (1998) and Exworthy et al. (2003)) 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Practice perspective on governance hybrid post-nGMS (based on frameworks 
by Hood (1998) and Exworthy et al. (2003)) 
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